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Abstract
We study what features an economic environment might possess, such that it
would be Pareto eﬃcient for the exchange of goods in that environment to be con-
ducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money. We prove a conjecture
that is essentially due to Bewley [1980, 1983]. Monetary spot trading is nearly eﬃ-
cient when there is only a single perishable good (or a composite commodity) at each
date and state of the world; random shocks are idiosyncratic, privately observed, and
temporary; markets are competitive; and the agents are very patient. This result is a
fairly close analogue, for trade using outside, ﬁat money, of a recent characterization
by Levine and Zame [2002] of environments in which spot trade using inside money,
in the form of one-period debt payable in a commodity, is nearly Pareto eﬃcient. We
also study an example where expansionary monetary mechanism Pareto dominates
laissez-faire or contractionary monetary mechanism in an environment with impatient
agents.
J.E.L. Classiﬁcation: E31, E42
Keywords: Friedman rule, monetary mechanism, expansionary monetary policy
∗The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
The research reported here is prompted by the debate in monetary economics regarding
Friedman’s [1969] provocative suggestion that an optimal monetary policy should generate
negative seignorage. While Friedman does not necessarily equate optimality of a policy
with ex ante Pareto eﬃciency of equilibrium under the policy, subsequent research has
made this identiﬁcation.
This debate has focused on whether a rate of negative seignorage as extreme as rec-
ommended by Friedman would be compatible with existence of an equilibrium (cf. Hellwig
[1982] and Bewley [1983]), and on whether the opportunity for self-insurance that is Fried-
man’s grounds for his recommendation is overshadowed by the loss of some insurance that
inﬂation implicitly provides (cf. Levine [1991])1 or the suboptimal incentives for agents on
both sides of a market to expend eﬀort in a search for trading partners (cf. Shi [1995]). How-
ever, the various critics of Friedman’s proposal seem to share an implicit assumption that
one should look for an eﬃcient monetary mechanism, rather than looking for an eﬃcient
mechanism within the potentially broader class of mechanisms that ﬁt the environmental
constraints that the use of money suggests must exist.
Our work stands in contrast to this tradition of ignoring nonmonetary mechanisms. We
admit such mechanisms, and study what features an economic environment might possess,
such that it would be Pareto eﬃcient for the exchange of goods in that environment to
be conducted on spot markets where those goods trade for money. We prove a conjecture
that is essentially due to Bewley [1980, 1983].2 Spot trading using money that pays zero
interest is nearly eﬃcient when there is only a single good (or a composite commodity)
at each date and state of the world; random shocks are idiosyncratic, privately observed,
and temporary; markets are competitive; and the agents are very patient. (When agents
1There is a small body of literature on the potential beneﬁcial eﬀect of social insurance that expansionary
monetary policy can provide. Levine [1991] and Kehoe, Levine and Woodford [1992] study two-state
Markov equilibrium in an environment where two types of agents switch their preferences stochastically
and equilibrium distribution of money balances is degenerate. Deviatov and Wallace [2001] study the issue
in a search theoretic model of money where money is indivisible and agents can hold at most two units of it.
Molico [1997] and Edmond [2002] provide numerical examples of expansionary monetary policy dominating
other policies, the former in a random-matching model of money, and the latter in a over-lapping generation
setting with money-in-utility-function.
2In [1980], Bewley conjectures that full risk sharing is achieved in the limit if a gross interest rate
virtually as high as the inverse of agents’ discount factor is paid, regardless of what value the discount
factor has. In [1983], he shows that setting the interest rate virtually at that level generally precludes
equilibrium from existing, but that the interest rate on money can be set arbitrarily close to the inverse of
the discount factor as the discount factor approaches unity.
1are patient, zero interest on money is close to the Friedman rule.) This result is a close
analogue, for trade using outside, ﬁat money, of a recent characterization by Levine and
Zame [2002] of environments in which spot trade using inside money, in the form of one-
period debt payable in a commodity, is nearly Pareto eﬃcient.
Bewley’s results, and his discussion of them, also make it clear that monetary spot
trading does not achieve full insurance if traders are impatient and risk averse. We sharpen
Bewley’s negative observation here.
Bewley’s negative observation is put in perspective by the research of Atkeson and Lucas
[1992], who characterize the symmetric, Pareto eﬃcient long-term contract in an environ-
ment closely similar to Bewley’s. That contract, which achieves an upper bound of what
any economic institution in Bewley’s environment could achieve, falls short of full insur-
ance. If the question to be resolved is whether or not (or in what circumstances) monetary
spot trading is an eﬃcient economic institution, then the relevant comparison would seem
to be between the equilibrium allocations of Bewley’s sequence of spot markets, on the one
hand, and Atkeson and Lucas’ contract on the other.3 Nevertheless this comparison, like
Bewley’s, indicates that monetary spot trading is ineﬃcient. That is, Atkeson and Lucas’
contractual allocation cannot be implemented by monetary spot trading.
Kocherlakota [2002] suggests that even Atkeson and Lucas’ allocation may not be the
most appropriate candidate for comparison with Bewley’s equilibrium allocation. Kocher-
lakota argues that monetary spot trade has two features that would make it obviously
ineﬃcient in many economic environments, and he concludes that the equilibrium alloca-
tion of monetary spot trading should be compared with the equilibrium allocation of an
eﬃcient mechanism in an environment where constraints impose the two limitations on all
mechanisms. One of the two features is almost complete anonymity, in the sense that
each agent must be treated on the basis of his current characteristics and behavior and
a one-dimensional summary statistic of his past characteristics and behavior. The other
feature is the ability of an agent at any time to consume his own endowment without inter-
ference or nonpecuniary punishment. This second feature entails that a mechanism cannot
induce agents to behave eﬃciently by threatening them with lower-than-autarky levels of
expected discounted utility otherwise. Both Levine and Zame’s spot-trading allocation
with inside money and also Atkeson and Lucas’ contractual allocation can be implemented
3Mas Colell and Vives [1993] show that Atkeson and Lucas’ contractual allocation can be implemented
by a mechanism, that is, by a game form that has feasible outcomes at all out-of-equilibrium message
proﬁles, as well as in equilibrium.
2subject to the constraint on dimensionality of information or memory. However, neither
of those allocations can be implemented without using nonpecuniary punishments for en-
forcement, since both allocations involve some agents being in date-event situations where
their expected discounted utility falls below the autarkic level. Kocherlakota shows that a
random-matching environment resembling those of Shi [1995] and Trejos and Wright [1995]
constrains a feasible mechanism to possess both features of monetary spot trading, but that
nevertheless there is a mechanism with an equilibrium allocation that Pareto dominates
monetary spot trading ex ante.
We study monetary spot trading in an environment that combines the constraints rep-
resented in the two bodies of research that we have just discussed. First, each agent’s
preferences among net trades in the current spot market and his current endowment are
private information (as in Bewley, Levine and Zame, and Atkeson and Lucas). Second,
agents can consume their own endowments without restriction or nonpecuniary punish-
ment (as in Kocherlakota). Because an agent’s characteristics are assumed to be private, a
feasible mechanism cannot condition the agent’s treatment directly on those characteristics
as the mechanism formulated by Kocherlakota does. Despite this constraint, we construct
an example of a Bewley environment in which an expansionary monetary mechanism is
Pareto superior to a laissez-faire or contractionary mechanism.
2. The environment
The economy is an inﬁnite horizon exchange economy. Time is discrete and denoted by
t =0 ,1,2,.... There is a continuum (I,I,µ) with measure 1 of inﬁnite-lived agents. At
each date, there is a single perishable good with which agents are endowed, and that they
trade and consume.
Agents’ endowments and preferences ﬂuctuate. For a generic agent i,h i sd a t e - t state
θit is a sequence of independent, identically distributed random variables taking values in
a ﬁnite state space Θ.4 Each θit has distribution π on Θ. Each agent’s state follows his
own independent process. We assume that the realization of the sequence of proﬁles of
4Bewley [1980, 1983] and Levine and Zame [2002] model each agent’s shocks as Markovian, and study
price-taking equilibrium in an economy with ﬁnitely many traders. Bewley assumes time is inﬁnite in the
past as well as the future, which avoids there being an initial condition and ensures existence of a stationary
equilibrium. Levine and Zame study an equilibrium that is not stationary in general. In the markovian
case, the stationary joint distribution of money balances and individual shocks is statistically dependent.
Since we will treat the initial distribution of money balances as part of the mechanism, and since we conﬁne
attention to stationary equilibria, we must restrict attention to i.i.d. shock processes.
3individual agents’ states  {θit}i∈I ∞
t=0 is an i.i.d. process of random variables with distribu-
tion π deﬁned on (I,I,µ), almost surely with respect to the probability space on which
the random states of all agents are deﬁned.5 To make explicit the mathematical structure
just described, we denote this probability space by (Ω,B,P). That is, for every i and t,
θit:Ω→ Θ; and for every n ∈ N and every 1–1 mapping f:{0,...,n}→I × N and every
mapping g:{0,...,n}→Θ, P(

m≤n{ω|θf(m)(ω)=g(m)})=Π m≤nπ({g(m)}). The formal
statement of our assumption is that, for every ω in an event B ∈Bwith P(B)=1 ,f o re v -




At each date, an agent with state θ ∈ Θ receives endowment e(θ)a n de n j o y sp e r i o d
utility u(c,θ)i fh ec o n s u m e sc units of good. The endowment good is perishable. E[e(θ)] >
0. The consumption set at each date, and on each sample path, is the set [0,∞)o f
nonnegative real numbers. The bounded function u:R+ × Θ → [0,b] is weakly increasing,
continuous, and concave in c. It is assumed that, when u(c,θ) is regarded as a function of
c, it has a positive, ﬁnite supergradient at e(θ).6 Agents maximize the discounted expected
utility of their future consumption streams, with common discount factor β.
Agents exchange endowments according to a trading mechanism that must be feasible
with respect to some informational constraints in the environment. Competitive trading
using money can be implemented by a mechanism that meets these constraints. First we
discuss the constraints and deﬁne a trading mechanism in general terms, and then we will
specify the mechanism that implements competitive monetary trade.
Each agent i privately learns his own realization of θit at date t. Each agent i delivers
aq u a n t i t yzit ∈ R+ of the endowment good to a resource pool at the planner’s disposition
and also sends a message mit ∈ R to the planner. The planner maintains a one-dimensional
summary statistic (that is, a real number) wit regarding i’s history, as will be described
fully below. The planner uses the summary statistics and messages of all agents and the
amounts contributed by all agents to update the summary statistic of each agent i and
to reallocate a quantity yit of the endowment good from the resource pool to i.A g e n t i
consumes cit = e(θit)−zit+yit. The quantities wit, mit, zit, yit, cit,a n dwi(t+1) are observed
by agent i and the planner, but not by the other agents.
The planner’s limited memory and the agents’ inability to observe or communicate with
5This assumption is not a theorem of probability, but it is a logically consistent extension of probability
theory. Cf. Green, [1994].
6That is, for some g>0, ∀c ∈ R+ u(c,θ) ≤ u(e(θ),θ)+g(c − e(θ)).
4one another are important features of the environment. The planner is not able to recall
the entire history of his dealings with agent i prior to date t, but only the one-dimensional
statistic wit. Because the agents are ignorant of other’s histories, states and reports, which
are reﬂected in the planner’s decisions, in principle an agent might draw inferences about
other agents from observing the planner’s decisions. Although the stationarity and “law-of-
large-numbers” assumptions regarding the particular environment studied here make such
inference uninformative, for logical clarity we will not suppress past decisions of the planner
as arguments of an agent’s decision rule.
Another feature that we emphasize heavily (following Kocherlakota [2002]) is the plan-
ner’s limited enforcement power. The planner cannot impose any nonpecuniary penalty
on an agent for sending or failing to send a particular message, or for not following an
instruction given in the planner’s message. The worst that the planner can do is to give
the agent nothing in the current period when the endowment pool is reallocated, and then
update the agent’s summary statistic to a value that encodes the fact that the prohibited
message has been sent or that the instruction has been ﬂouted, and then to treat the agent
ungenerously in the future as a result of the summary statistic having that unfavorable
value. In particular, the worst outcome that the planner can impose on an agent is au-
tarky. (The planner would impose autarky on agent i by setting yit = 0for the current and
all future t. Faced with this planner’s policy, i would optimally set zit = 0for all future t.)
We will denote the set of proﬁles of summary statistics of all agents by F,t h es e to f
proﬁles of agents’ contributions to the resource pool by P, and the set of proﬁles of agents’
messages to the planner by G. Formally, let F be the set of measurable functions from I to
R,l e tP be the set of nonnegative-valued functions in F,a n dl e tG = F.7 If f ∈ F,t h e nw e
use fi to denote f(i), and so forth with elements of other spaces of functions on I. A trading
mechanism consists of an initial w0 ∈ F and time-indexed sequences of updating rules W =
 Wt:F×G×P → F t∈N and reallocation rules Y =  Yt:F×G×P → P t∈N. We assume that
the planner is able to assign w0 according to any distribution in a way that is independent
of all θit considered as a random variables deﬁned on (I,I,µ), almost surely with respect
to (Ω,B,P).8 If wt ∈ F, mt ∈ G,a n dzt ∈ P, are the proﬁles of agents’ summary statistics,
7An agent can report a real number to the planner. Alternatively, if R is mapped onto Θ, then the
mapping provides a semantics by which an agent can report his current state.
8Formally, we require that the planner observes a uniformly distributed r.v. U:I → [0,1] such that,
for every ω in an event B ∈Bwith P(B) = 1, the following condition holds. For every probability
measure ψ on R,i n t e r v a l[ a,b] ⊆ [0,1], n ∈ N, and every mapping f:{0,...,n}→N and every mapping
g:{0,...,n}→Θ, µ({i|a ≤ U(i) ≤ b}∩

m≤n({i|θif(m)(ω)=g(m)})=( b − a)Πm≤nπ({g(m)}). Then,
given an arbitrary measure ψ on R that the planner wants to make the distribution of w0 and letting f be
5messages, and endowment contributions at date t;a n di fwt+1 ∈ F and yt ∈ P are the
proﬁles of the planner’s updated summary statistics for the agents and reallocations of
endowment to them; then wt+1 = Wt(wt,m t,z t), and yt = Yt(wt,m t,z t). The reallocation
rule Yt must satisfy the materials-balance condition that

I Yit(wt,m t,z t)dµ ≤

I zit dµ.
Agent i’s strategy consists of time-indexed sequences of functions M =  Mit t∈N and
Z =  Zit t∈N that specify i’s message and the quantity of the endowment good that he
delivers, respectively, at date t.A g e n t i has full recall of his own history, including the
histories of his states, the values of the summary statistic that the planner has assigned him,
and his endowment-good deliveries and messages to the planner. Because i can recursively
reconstruct his past deliveries and messages from the other data, those past actions do
not have to be explicit arguments of his current decision functions. We can thus represent
Mit:(R×Θ)t+1 → R and Zit:(R×Θ)t+1 → R+.T h a ti s ,mit = Mit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it)a n d
zit = Zit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it). There is a feasibility constraint that i cannot deliver more
than his endowment, that is, Zit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it) ≤ e(θit).
Now we represent a competitive trading arrangement using a constant nominal stock of
ﬁat money as such a mechanism. We suppose that agents hold money as account balances
rather than as physical inventories of a ﬁat object. Indeed, an agent’s money wealth
(that is, the amount of money in his account) is the summary statistic that the planner
will initially assign and subsequently update. We require that

I |wi0|dµ < ∞.A t e v e r y
date t, the planner essentially operates a spot market according to the rules of a Shapley-
Shubik [1977] trading game. The planner interprets each agent’s message as a bid to spend
money to acquire other traders’ endowment, disregarding messages that are negative or that
exceed the sender’s balance. That is, the planner considers ˜ mit =m a x ( 0 ,min(mit,w it)) to
be the money bid of agent i. These money bids and the agents’ contributions zit determine
the spot price pt =

I ˜ mit dµ/

I zit dµ. The planner redistributes ˜ mit/pt quantity of the
endowment pool to each trader i and adds ptzit − ˜ mit to the wealth wit of agent i.T h a ti s ,
if we represent the proﬁle of ˜ mit by deﬁning B:F × G → P according to ∀iB i(w,m)=
max(0,min(mi,w i)), then











− Bi(wt,m t). (2)
We call a mechanism of this form a laissez-faire monetary mechanism, since the planner
the c.d.f. of ψ, he can deﬁne wi0 =m i n {x|U(i) ≤ f(x)}.
6does not pay interest on money nor tax money nor adjust the nominal money stock after
date 0, but merely operates a market on which the agents trade competitively. Note that
the speciﬁcations of Y and W just given are part of the deﬁnition of the class of laissez-faire
monetary mechanisms. That is, laissez-faire monetary mechanisms diﬀer from one another
only in how the initial summary statistics (that is, agents’ initial money balances) wi0 are
assigned.
We call a monetary mechanism stationary expansionary (resp. stationary contrac-
tionary)i ft h e r ei saτ>0(resp. τ<0),












I wit dµ is the aggregate money balance in the economy. That is, with a
stationary expansionary mechanism, an agent’s summary statistics is updated as if his
after-trade money holdings is inﬂated at a constant rate τ, and the seignorage is distributed
as a lump-sum transfer. In contrast, with a contractionary monetary mechanism, an agent’s
summary statistics is updated as if he receives interest payment on his money holdings at
ar a t eτ which is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on the population.
3. Deﬁnition of equilibrium
We focus on symmetric equilibria, in which all agents use the same strategy (M,Z).
(That is, M and Z are inﬁnite sequences of functions with the domains and ranges speciﬁed
above. Agents may take diﬀerent actions from one another because their individual states
are distinct points of the domains of these decision functions.) A competitive equilibrium is
represented by a strategy that each trader is assumed to follow. A strategy is an equilibrium
strategy if each agent acts optimally by following it, when he takes it as parametric that
the other traders will follow the strategy.
It is well known that such an equilibrium can be characterized by dynamic programming.
Consider a mechanism (w0,W ,Y), where each of W and Y is a time-indexed sequence of
functions. Consider a strategy (M,Z), where each of M and Z is a time-indexed sequence
of functions, and consider the value function of a trader i participating in the mechanism,
who takes it as parametric that the other traders will all follow (M,Z). Let wt be the
proﬁle of all agents’ summary statistics at the beginning of date t.F o rj  = i, deﬁne mjt =
Mjt(wj0,θ j0,...,w jt,θ jt)a n dzjt = Zjt(wj0,θ j0,...,w jt,θ jt). Then deﬁne m∗(m)t ob et h e
7message proﬁle that results from i sending message m while every other agent j sends the
message mjt speciﬁed by strategy M. Formally, deﬁne m∗:R → G by [m∗(m)](i)=m and
∀j  = i [m∗(m)](j)=mjt and deﬁne z∗:R → P by [z∗(z)](i)=z and ∀j  = i [z∗(z)](j)=
zjt. Now the value function V ∗




















The expectation on the right side is taken with respect to the measure π on Θ. Standard
reasoning about the ﬁxed point of a contraction mapping establishes that the sequence
V ∗
0 ,V∗
1 ,... is uniquely deﬁned. The initial proﬁle of summary statistics w0,t h es t a t i s t i c -
updating rules Wt, and a strategy (M,Z) determine a sequence of summary statistics wt.
The strategy (M,Z) is an equilibrium strategy if, for all t and for all w in the range of wt,
Z and M specify the optimizing values of z and m in the expression on the right side of
the value function.
For an equilibrium strategy (M,Z), deﬁne the value function sequence of the equilibrium
by Vt(wit)=V ∗
t (wit,w t). In particular, in the case of a monetary mechanism with stationary
policy τ, Yt and Wt are deﬁned in terms of the price
pt =

I Mit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it)dµ

I Zit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it)dµ
.
Utilizing these observations, the value to an agent of having the summary statistic w at














Restricting m to the interval [0,w t] is justiﬁed by the fact that ˜ m = wt if m>w t,a n d
˜ m =0i fm<0.
We conclude this section by deﬁning stationary Markov competitive equilibrium of a
monetary mechanism, the existence of which will be investigated in Section 4. Deﬁne
the current-date projection mapping γ:
	
t∈N(R×Θ)t+1 → R×Θb yγ(w0,θ 0,...,w t,θ t)=
(wt,θ t). A sequence  Ht:(R×Θ)t+1 → R t∈N is stationary Markov if for each t, Ht = H0◦γ.
An equilibrium (M,Z) is a stationary Markov competitive equilibrium if the sequences
M and Z are stationary Markov and almost surely with respect to (Ω,B,P), w0 and
w1 are identically distributed random variables on I. These are suﬃcient conditions for
8 wit,θ it,c it t∈N to be almost surely a stationary Markov process on I and for the spot price

I ˜ mit dµ/

I zit dµ to be constant over time.9
Given any such equilibrium, clearly there is another monetary mechanism for which the
time-invariant price is 1 and the equilibrium allocation is identical to that of the original
mechanism. The new mechanism is obtained simply by dividing wi0 by the equilibrium price
p0, for each trader i. The equilibrium strategy in the mechanism is obtained from that of the
old one by the same normalization. In a stationary Markov competitive equilibrium with
price 1, the deﬁnition of equilibrium can be simpliﬁed by deﬁning the net trade xt = zt−mt.








τQ+( 1− τ)(w + x)

. (6)
4. Existence of a laissez-faire monetarymechanism having a sta-
tionaryMarkov competitive equilibrium
In this section we prove that, for any environment satisfying the assumptions in Section
2, there is a laissez-faire monetary mechanism that has a stationary Markov competitive
equilibrium.10 This is done by studying an auxiliary optimization problem of an autarkic
agent who can store the endowment good without depreciation, and by applying informa-
tion about the solution of this problem to construct the equilibrium.
Consider an environment identical to that of Section 2 except in three respects: there
is only one agent rather than a continuum, he receives an endowment of size w0 + e(θ0)a t
date 0, and he can store without depreciation the endowment that he has received. Other
aspects of the model are the same. That is, the agent’s endowment and utility are functions
of an i.i.d. process  θt t∈N taking values in a ﬁnite set Θ and having distribution π.H e
receives endowment w0 + e(θ0) at date 0and e(θt) at each date t>0. The agent chooses
date-0consumption c0 from [0,w 0 + e(θ0)] and, for t>0, chooses date-t consumption ct
from [0,w t +e(θt)] (where wt = wt−1 +e(θt−1)−ct−1) as a function of previous history. He
9Note that the function sequences W and Y of a laissez-faire monetary mechanism are stationary
Markov. The deﬁnition of stationary equilibrium given here is the appropriate deﬁnition, in view of this
fact. An example of a monetary mechanism that is not itself stationary Markov is one in which each agent
receive a so-called “helicopter drop,” that is, a ﬁxed amount of newly created ﬁat money, proportional
to the current aggregate nominal money stock, in each period. The mechanism is not stationary Markov
because the amount received, which grows geometrically, is a time-dependent, additively separable term of
W. The appropriate deﬁnition of stationary Markov equilibrium for this mechanism would focus on time
invariance of the distribution of agents’ real balances, rather than of their nominal balances.
10The proof can be easily extended to the case of stationary expansionary monetary mechanism.
9maximizes expected discounted utility E[


t∈N βtu(ct,θ t)], and his utility function u(c,θ)i s
bounded, and strictly increasing and concave in c.
Standard dynamic programming results (cf. Lucas and Stokey [1989]) provide the fol-
lowing information.
Lemma 1. For the auxiliary problem, there is a decision function C:R+ × Θ → R+
such that the agent’s optimal choice at every date t is that ct = C(wt,θ t). There is a strictly
concave, increasing value function V :R+ → [0,b/(1 − β)] such that, for all w and θ,
C(w,θ) = arg max
c∈[0,w+e(θ)]
[u(c,θ)+βV(w + e(θ) − c)] (7)
and V (w)=E[u(C(w,θ),θ)+βV(w+e(θ)−C(w,θ))]. There is a probability measure ψ on
R+ such that  (wt,θ t) θ∈N is a Markov process that has stationary transition probabilities
and that converges weakly to a stationary asymptotic distribution such that the marginal
distribution of w is ψ.
For this speciﬁc optimization problem, Lemma 1 can be sharpened by showing that ψ
has bounded support.
Lemma 2. For the stationary asymptotic marginal distribution ψ of Lemma 1, there
exists ¯ w ∈ R+ such that ψ([0, ¯ w]) = 1.
Proof.S i n c e V is concave, for every w ∈ R+, there is a supergradient gw ∈ R+ satisfying,
for all x ∈ R+, V (x) ≤ V (w)+( x − w)gw. Setting x = 0and noting that 0 ≤ V (0) ≤
V (w) ≤ b/(1 − β), the supergradient inequality yields gw ≤ b/(w(1 − β)). For each θ ∈ Θ,
consider u(c,θ) as a function of c and let hθ ∈ R+ be a supergradient of the function at
e(θ). If ¯ w>b / ((1 − β)min θ∈Θ hθ), then equation (7) implies that C(w,θ) >e (θ) for all
w ≥ ¯ w and for all θ.T h u s wt > ¯ w implies that wt+1 <w t. Equation (7) also shows,
in conjunction with the fact (established in Rockafellar [1970], Theorem 24.3) that every
selection from the superdiﬀerential of a continuous concave function is nonincreasing, that
wt ≤ ¯ w implies wt+1 ≤ ¯ w.T h a ti s ,wt ﬁrst decreases monotonically to a level not exceeding
¯ w if w0 > ¯ w, and then does not escape from the interval [0, ¯ w]. Therefore, since ψ is the
marginal of a stationary distribution, ψ([0, ¯ w]) = 1.
Now we apply this information regarding solution of the auxiliary problem to specifying
a laissez-faire monetary mechanism that has a stationary Markov competitive equilibrium.
10Proposition 1. In an environment such as has been described in Section 2, and where
the utility function u is strictly concave in c for each θ, there is a laissez-faire monetary
mechanism that has a stationary Markov competitive equilibrium.
Proof. This mechanism is speciﬁed by distributing w0 according to the stationary marginal
distribution ψ in the solution of the auxiliary problem. Clearly ψ has ﬁnite mean, since
µ is a ﬁnite measure and ψ has bounded support by Lemma 2. The agents’ stationary
strategy is deﬁned in terms of the decision function C of Lemma 1. Speciﬁcally for every
agent i, Mit(wi0,θ i0,...w it,θ it)=m a x ( 0 ,C(wit,θ it) − e(θit)a n dZit(wi0,θ i0,...w it,θ it)=
max(0,e(θit)−C(wit,θ it)). By induction on t, the joint distribution of wt and θt (as random
variables on (I,I,µ)) is the same as the stationary distribution of w and θ in the auxiliary
problem.11 Thus, by stationarity of that distribution, the equilibrium price pt is 1 and the
distribution of wt+1 is also ψ.S i n c ept =1f o ra l lt almost surely, the decision problem of
an agent in this equilibrium is isomorphic to the agents’ decision problem in the auxiliary
problem. Thus M and Z are an equilibrium strategy because C is the optimal strategy in
the auxiliary problem.
Two points are worth mentioning. First, we impose strict concavity of u in Lemma
1 and Proposition 1 so that the optimal strategy C given in equation (7) is continuous
and the asymptotic distribution ψ is stationary (cf. Lucas and Stokey [1989]). Second,
autarky is obviously also an equilibrium of this mechanism. We do not know whether or
not there are multiple non-autarkic equilibrium. But given the way that the equilibrium is
constructed, it Pareto dominates all other equilibrium ex ante.
5. Equilibrium of a laissez-faire monetarymechanism is nearly
eﬃcient if agents are suﬃcientlypatient
In this section we show that stationary Markov competitive equilibrium of a laissez-
faire monetary mechanism is nearly ex ante Pareto eﬃcient in an environment of suﬃciently
patient traders. To do so, consider a family of environments that are identical in all respects
except for the value β of the agents’ discount factor. We will show that, as β approaches 1,
the equilibria constructed in the proof of Proposition 1—in which each trader’s optimization
problem is isomorphic to that of an autarkic agent whose endowment is perfectly storable—
are nearly eﬃcient.
11This assertion holds almost surely with respect to (Ω,B,P).
11The concept of near eﬃciency that we study is a variant of Debreu’s [1951] coeﬃcient
of resource utilization. A mechanism in an environment is δ-eﬃcient,f o rδ ∈ (0,1], if it
has an equilibrium allocation that all agents would weakly prefer ex ante to the full-risk-
sharing allocation of the environment in which the endowment of the actual environment
is shrunken to any scalar replica of proportion smaller than δ.
Formally, ﬁx a stochastic process θ, endowment function e, and utility function u satis-
fying the requirements of Proposition 1, so that stationary Markov competitive equilibrium
is assured to exist. For β ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1], deﬁne Eβδ to be the environment with
stochastic process θ in which all agents’ preferences are characterized by utility function
u and discount factor β, and in which each trader i receives endowment δe(θit)a td a t e
t.L e t rδ:Θ → R+ be a mapping such that E[rδ(θ) − δe(θ)] = 0and also such that
there is a common supergradient of {u(rδ(θ),θ)}θ∈Θ.12 The allocation implied by rδ is the




θ∈Θ π(θ)u(rδ(θ),θ). Uδ/(1 − β) is the ex ante expected discounted utility of con-
sumption in a full-risk-sharing allocation of environment Eβδ. Note that the consumption
levels rδ(θ) and the expected utility Uδ per period do not depend onβ. By the assumption of
Proposition 1 that each u(c,θ) is strictly concave in c, δ<εimplies that ∀θr δ(θ) <r ε(θ).
Thus, because a strictly concave, increasing function on R+ is strictly increasing, δ<ε
implies that Uδ <U ε. Deﬁne Vβ to be the ex ante expected value of consumption in the
stationary Markov competitive equilibrium of the laissez-faire monetary mechanism con-
structed in the proof of Proposition 1. (That is, Vβ = EψV (w0), where V is the value
function for the auxiliary problem of Lemma 1 with discount factor β.) Then the laissez-
faire monetary mechanism in environment Eβ1 is δ-eﬃcient if δ =s u p {ε|Vβ ≥ Uε/(1 − β)}.
Proposition 2. For any δ<1,t h e r ei saβ<1 such that the laissez-faire monetary
mechanism is an δ-eﬃcient mechanism of the environments with discount factors in [β,1).
Proof.W es e tε =( 1+δ)/2, and we construct a strategy that asymptotically provides
the full-risk-sharing allocation in Eβε. The expected discounted utility that this strategy
yields is a lower bound for Vβ, which is the expected discounted utility that an agent’s
optimal strategy yields. We prove the proposition by using the strategy to show that, for
suﬃciently large β, the lower bound is suﬃciently close to Uε/(1−β)t h a tVβ ≥ Uδ/(1−β).
12If u (rδ(θ),θ)e x i s t sf o re a c ht, then the condition that this derivative has the same value for all θ is
equivalent.
12As in the proof of Lemma 2, we deﬁne the strategy in terms of the consumption func-
tion that it implies. Deﬁne Γ:R+ × Θ → R+ by Γ(w,θ)=m i n ( w + e(θ),r ε(θ)). That
is, the agent attempts to replicate the consumption that he would enjoy in the full-risk-
sharing allocation in Eβε, subject to the constraint that the laissez-faire monetary mech-
anism in the actual economy Eβ1 places on his choice. The strategy for agent i implied
by this consumption function is that M∗
t (wi0,θ i0,....w it,θ it)=m a x ( 0 ,Γ(wit,θ it) − e(θit))
and Z∗
t (wi0,θ i0,....w it,θ it)=m a x ( 0 ,e(θit) − Γ(wit,θ it)). The wealth-updating rule of the
laissez-faire monetary mechanism entails that wi(t+1)−wit =( 1 −ε)e(θit)+εe(θit)−Γ(wit,θ it).
Deﬁne vit =( 1−ε)(e(θit)−E[e(θit)])+εe(θit)−rε(θit). Note that  vit t∈N is i.i.d., E[vit]=0,
and wi(t+1) −wit ≥ vit. Applying a law of the iterated logarithm (Breiman [1968],Theorem
13.25) to the sums


τ<tviτ establishes that limt→∞ wit = ∞ almost surely. Therefore,
almost surely ∃τ ∀t≥τ Γ(wit,θ it)=rε(θit).
There is a number ϕ>0such that Uε − ϕb > Uδ. By the preceding argument, there is
date τ such that P({ω|∀t≥τ Γ(wit,θ it)=rε(θit)}) > 1 − ϕ/2.















= E[u(rε(θit))] − bP(Ω\D)
>U ε − (ϕ/2)b.
Therefore Vβ ≥ E[


t≥τ βtu(Γ(wit,θ it))] >β τ(Uε − (ϕ/2)b)/(1 − β), so Vβ >U δ/(1 − β)i f
β ≥ [(Uε − ϕb)/(Uε − (ϕ/2)b)]1/τ.
6. An example where expansionarypolicyPareto dominates
laissez-faire
The approximate eﬃciency of laissez-faire policy with very patient agents does not
preclude an expansionary policy from being even better. The potential eﬃciency loss
might be large when agents are impatient. In this section, we study a specialization of the
environment discussed above. We show that the equilibrium of a expansionary monetary
mechanism is eﬃcient while a laissez-faire or contractionary monetary mechanism is not. It
remains as a question whether in some environment a nonmonetary mechanism dominates
any monetary mechanism.
13Consider an environment where agents’ marginal utility ﬂuctuates between high (state
h)a n dl o w( s t a t el)o v e rt i m e ,Θ={h, l}⊆R+ and 0 <l<h , but they all receive a
constant endowment e(θ) ≡ e for all θ ∈ Θ every period. For agent i, θit is i.i.d. with
a Bernoulli(1/2), that is, the probability of θit = h is 1/2 for all t ≥ 0. Agents have a
satiation level of consumption ζ each period, ζ>2e. An agent with an individual state θ
derives period utility
u(c, θ)=θmin{c, ζ} (8)
from consuming c units of endowment.13
Given that preference shocks are independent across agents, and each agent’s preference
shock follows a Bernoulli process, at each period, half of the population have high marginal
utility and the other half have low marginal utility. The ﬁrst-best outcome (eﬃcient alloca-
tion subject only to material balance constraint) in this environment is to have agents with
low marginal utility transfer all endowment to agents with high marginal utility. Moreover,
because utility is linear on [0,ζ ], any such transfer that does not exceed state-h traders’
satiation levels is eﬃcient. We show that under some parameter restriction, such an out-
come can be achieved as an equilibrium of a stationary expansionary monetary mechanism.
The eﬃciency of expansionary policy in this example is fragile. It depends crucially on the
local risk-neutrality just mentioned. Nevertheless, it is a robust feature (cf. footnote 13)
that this policy is superior to laissez-faire..
Consider a stationary monetary mechanism speciﬁed by policy τ and trading price
normalized to 1. That is, for any t ≥ 0, any proﬁles of agents’ summary statistics wt ∈ F,
messages mt ∈ G, and endowment contributions zt ∈ P, for any agent i,
Yit(wt,z t,m t)=m a x ( 0 , min(mit,w it)) (9)
Wit(wt,z t,m t)=τQ+( 1− τ)(wit + zit − mit)( 1 0)
where Q =

I witdµ. We are going to show that the following strategy is an equilibrium
strategy of the mechanism,
Zit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it)=

e if θit = l;
0otherwise
(11)
Mit(wi0,θ i0,...,w it,θ it)=

0if θit = l
wit otherwise
(12)
13In this speciﬁcation, the utility function is not strictly concave and the agent is satiated at consumption
level ζ. These simplifying assumptions are not crucial to the results derived here. We could deﬁne u(c,θ)=
θmin{c, ζ} + f(c), where f:R+ → R+ is a strictly concave, increasing function having very small right
derivative at 0, and our arguments would remain sound. The utility function so deﬁned would be strictly
concave and increasing in consumption in every state.
14That is, an agent spends all his money on consumption when marginal utility is high
(θit = h), and sells all his endowment e when his marginal utility is low (θit = l). Such an
outcome is eﬃcient.
Following this strategy, agents’ money balances (summary statistics) are concentrated
on a set {αn}∞
n=0,w h e r eαn is an agent’s money balance after n consecutive sales since his
last purchase,
α0 = τQ (13)
∀n ≥ 1 αn = τQ+( 1− τ)(αn−1 + e). (14)









Given that the environment is stationary, and that agents’ taste shock follows a Bernoulli
process, for all n ≥ 0, the measure of agents whose money balances are αn is

















Solving Q from (17), we have
Q = e. (18)
That is, at this equilibrium, aggregate real money balance at any date (which is also
per capita real money balance given that the measure of agent is 1) equals to an agent’s






Given the satiation level ζ, the optimality of strategy for θit = h (spending all money on
consumption) requires that e + αn ≤ ζ for all n ≥ 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for





The value function on {αn}∞
















2 − β(1 − τ)
(22)
∀n ≥ 1 V (αn)=V (αn−1)+
he(1 + τ)(1 − τ)n
2 − β(1 − τ)
. (23)
By (15), (18) and (23),
V (αn) − V (αn−1)
αn − αn−1
=
he(1 + τ)(1 − τ)n
2 − β(1 − τ)






2 − β(1 − τ)
(24)
which is a constant. Hence, the value function V is aﬃne on [eτ, e/τ) with slope given by
(24).
Given the value function, we can verify that the conjectured strategy (M, Z) given in
(11) and (12) as equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 3.S t r a t e g y(M, Z) given in (11) and (12) is optimal if the parameters




β(h + l) − 2l
β(h + l)
. (25)
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality of condition (25) is a restatement of condition (20). We need
only to show the second half of the condition.
When θit = h, strategy (M, Z) speciﬁes the optimal net trade to be x∗ = −wit.T h i si s
optimal if for any ε>0, and any x ∈ [−wit,e ] such that x − ε ∈ [−wit,e ], the expected
value of net trade x is lower than that of x − ε,t h a ti s ,
h(e−x)+βV(τe+(1−τ)(wit +x)) ≤ h(e−x+ε)+βV(τe+(1−τ)(wit +x−ε)). (26)
Given that the value function V is aﬃne with slope h/(2 − β(1 − τ)), this inequality is
equivalent to
βh





which always holds. That is, given the ﬁrst half of condition (25), x∗ = −wit when θit = h
is optimal.
16When θit = l, strategy (M, Z) speciﬁes the optimal net trade to be x∗ = e.T h i s i s
optimal if for any ε>0,a n y x ∈ [−wit,e ] such that x + ε ∈ [−wit,e ], the expected value
of net trade x is lower than that of x + ε,t h a ti s ,
l(e − x)+βV(τe+( 1− τ)(wit + x)) ≤ l(e− x − ε)+βV(τe+( 1−τ)(wit + x + ε)). (28)





2 − β(1 − τ)
or the second half of condition (25). That is, x∗ = e when θit = l is optimal if the second
half of condition (25) is satisﬁed.
By Proposition 3, the eﬃcient allocation in this environment is achieved by the equi-
librium of a stationary expansionary monetary mechanism since policy τ>e / (ζ − e) > 0.
Any policy with τ ≤ 0, i.e., laissez-faire or contractionary monetary mechanism, would not
accomplish the task. With an expansionary policy, all agents’ money balances are bounded
by e/τ given that they are constantly inﬂated away at a rate τ. So “rich” people can never
get too rich to not perform. If τ ≤ 0, however, agents’ money balances are unbounded.
This is because for any integer n, an agent can experience a sequence of consecutive low
marginal utility shock l of length n or longer with strictly positive probability. Let ˆ t be the
smallest t such that βth<l , so for all t ≥ ˆ t, the discounted marginal utility of consumption
in state h after t periods is lower than the marginal utility of consuming in today’s l state.
Then when an agent in state l today has money balances t(ζ − e), t ≥ ˆ t, he will consume
rather than selling his endowment, contrary to what eﬃcient allocation calls for.
7. Conclusion
We consider a class of environments where there is a stringent restriction on the amount
of information that can be kept regarding the history of each agent, where an agent’s en-
dowment cannot be taken from him forcibly or by threat of nonpecuniary punishment, and
where an agent’s current characteristics are his private information. We suggest that this
class of environments formalizes the assumptions under which, according to previous con-
jectures, spot trade using ﬁat money can be an exactly or approximately eﬃcient allocation
mechanism if monetary policy is set appropriately. Within this class of environments, we
provide an explicit deﬁnition of a monetary mechanism and particularly of a monetary
17mechanism governed by laissez-faire policy. We show that a laissez-faire monetary mecha-
nism is nearly eﬃcient, in terms of a criterion in the spirit of Debreu’s coeﬃcient of resource
utilization for ex ante Pareto eﬃciency, in an environment within our class where agents
are suﬃciently patient. We also provide an example that shows that, in an environment
within our class where agents are impatient, an expansionary monetary mechanism can
Pareto dominate any laissez-faire or contractionary monetary mechanism.
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